Changes in Property Tax Progressivity for Florida Homeowners after the “Save Our Homes Amendment? by Marcus T. Allen & William H. Dare
JRER  Vol. 31  N o . 1–2 0 0 9
Changes in Property Tax Progressivity for
Florida Homeowners after the ‘‘Save Our
Homes Amendment’’
Authors Marcus T. Allen and William H. Dare
Abstract The ‘‘Save Our Homes Amendment’’ (SOHA) to Florida’s
constitution limits annual increases in the taxable value of a
homestead property to 3% or the rate of inﬂation (whichever is
less) as long as the property is owned by the same owner. The
amount of property value protected from taxation throughout the
state by this amendment has grown to over $246 billion (13.9%
of total property value) since the amendment’s implementation
in 1995. This study tests whether the protection has accrued
disproportionately over time among homestead property owners,
the very group of people the amendment was intended to protect.
The results suggest that the amendment has reduced the degree
of progressivity in the state’s property tax system such that the
owners of lower value home properties are shouldering an
increasing proportion of the property tax burden relative to the
owners of higher value homestead properties. The differential
impacts of the SOHA across value ranges of homestead
properties are likely attributable to differential appreciation and
ownership transfers for higher and lower value homestead
properties throughout the state.
In 1992, Florida voters approved the ‘‘Save Our Homes Amendment’’ (SOHA) to
the state constitution to limit the annual increase in the taxable value of a
homestead property to 3% or the rate of inﬂation, whichever is less, regardless of
actual annual increases in the property’s market value during the owner’s tenure.1,2
The SOHA protects owners of homestead properties with rapidly increasing
market values from large increases in their property tax liabilities from one year
to the next as long as they continue to own the property. Upon a transfer of
ownership of the property, however, the taxable value is ‘‘reset’’ to the current
market value for the new owner. As a result, homestead properties may have very
different effective tax rates (property tax levied divided by market value) if the
owners have occupied the properties for different time periods with different
appreciation rates.
The provisions of the SOHA were implemented in 1995 and the amount of
property value protected from taxation since that time has increased steadily to82  Allen and Dare
just over $246 billion, or 13.9% of the total real property value within the state
as of 2005. There is little doubt that the SOHA has shifted a signiﬁcant portion
of the property tax burden in the state onto the shoulders of non-homestead
property owners. The purpose of this study, however, is to consider whether the
SOHA has impacted the vertical equity or ‘‘fairness’’ in Florida’s property tax
system within the class of properties it was intended to protect (homestead
properties).
A property tax system can be deﬁned as vertically equitable if the taxable values
of all properties in the jurisdiction are assessed at the same percentage of market
value across all market value ranges.3 In other words, a vertically equitable ad
valorem tax system levies taxes on the same proportion of market value for all
properties, regardless of actual market value. A vertically inequitable tax system
can be further classiﬁed as ‘‘regressive’’ if higher value properties are taxed more
favorably than lower value properties and ‘‘progressive’’ if higher value properties
are taxed less favorably than lower value properties. [See Paglin and Fogarty
(1972) and Clapp (1990) for more discussion of this deﬁnition of tax system
equity.] The Florida property tax system is inherently progressive due to a standard
$25,000 exemption to which all homestead properties, regardless of value, are
entitled. All homestead properties in Florida within a given taxing jurisdiction
face the same stated tax rate, but the ﬁxed exemption amount for all homestead
properties means that lower value homesteads face a lower assessment ratio and,
therefore, a lower effective tax rate, than higher value homesteads, other things
held constant.
The issue of whether the SOHA has affected the equity of Florida’s property tax
system arises when one considers that appreciation amounts and length of owner
tenures may vary for properties in different market value ranges.4 Over time, the
amount of value protected from taxation by the SOHA may vary across properties
with different market values, thus leading to changes in the degree of vertical
equity in the property tax system. This study detects changes in the progressivity
of Florida’s property tax system over a period of rising property values throughout
the state.5
This paper is presented as follows. We ﬁrst review the history of the SOHA in
Florida and then provide summary evidence of the magnitude of its overall impact
on taxable property values. We then describe the data sample and the method used
in this study to analyze changes in the equity of the property tax system using a
sample of over 17 million homestead properties throughout the state. The ﬁnal
section summarizes the results.
 A Brief History of the SOHA
The SOHA appeared on Florida’s 1992 general referendum ballot as a result of a
four-year-long, grass roots petition drive aimed at limiting property tax increases
for Florida homeowners. As mentioned earlier, the SOHA limits the annualChanges in Property Tax Progressivity  83
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increase in the taxable value of a homestead property to 3% or the rate of inﬂation,
regardless of the actual annual increase in the property’s market value. Upon a
transfer of ownership of the property, however, the taxable value is ‘‘reset’’ to the
current market value for the new owner. The sponsoring organization for the
petition drive (Save Our Homes, Inc., led by the elected property appraiser from
a rapidly growing county in southwest Florida) sought voter support by, among
other strategies, citing situations in which ﬁxed-income, elderly, and/or lower-
income homeowners who owned homes in areas with rapidly increasing values
were being forced out of their homes because they could not afford to pay their
property tax bills.
Critics responded by noting that this argument ignores the fact that even though
the homeowners may not have experienced increases in income, they have
experienced increases in their wealth as a result of increasing property values.
Referring to the amendment as the ‘‘Property Appraisers’ Re-election Act’’ and
the ‘‘Wealthy Homeowners’ Relief Act,’’ some opponents logically concluded that
the beneﬁts from the amendment would be much greater for owners of properties
with greater appreciation rates and for residents who occupy their homes for
longer time periods. Critics also suggested that the amendment would unfairly
shift a larger portion of the tax burden onto non-homestead properties and that
the amendment would discourage people from moving from one home to another.
Despite these objections, the petition drive was successful and the amendment was
ultimately approved with 54% of the voter-turnout in November, 1992.
Even after its approval by voters, the SOHA has faced several efforts to alter its
provisions over the years. The Florida Department of Revenue challenged the
amendment in state court soon after its approval by voters because it did not
include an effective date of implementation. In 1994, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that the amendment would take effect on January 1, 1995. Another potential
change to the amendment was proposed in 1998 by some members of the state’s
Constitution Revision Commission. This commission is a panel of citizens that is
created every 20 years to review the state constitution and suggest changes to
voters. The panel voted 19–7 against supporting another constitution amendment
referendum that would limit the original provisions to apply only to homes worth
less than $200,000.
More recently, the 2006 and 2007 sessions of the state legislature included debate
on several potential changes to the SOHA, with most of the discussion centered
on removal or modiﬁcation of the ‘‘reset’’ provision. The rapid rise in property
values around the state in recent years has generated a large amount of property
tax protection for many homestead property owners, especially those who have
owned their properties for longer time periods. If those owners decided to sell
their current homestead and move to a different homestead (even one of equal
value), their tax burden would increase by a signiﬁcant amount. In addition, many
taxing jurisdictions in the state have kept their stated tax rates at or near the same
levels during this time period and total tax revenues have increased dramatically.
Total property tax revenue in Florida has more than doubled from 1997 to 2006,84  Allen and Dare











1995 $683,123,766,217 — $3,506,404,838 0.5%
1996 $723,296,852,199 5.88% $5,938,987,246 0.8%
1997 $769,223,110,139 6.35% $9,057,852,107 1.2%
1998 $825,142,971,677 7.27% $14,131,913,869 1.7%
1999 $824,300,534,955 0.10% $20,753,804,777 2.5%
2000 $889,160,096,936 7.87% $27,815,434,639 3.1%
2001 $991,457,251,414 11.50% $47,678,672,028 4.8%
2002 $1,112,860,700,518 12.24% $80,364,008,731 7.2%
2003 $1,262,626,628,511 13.46% $117,830,891,821 9.3%
2004 $1,452,501,131,102 15.04% $165,144,250,184 11.4%
2005 $1,772,224,212,718 22.01% $246,253,858,022 13.9%
Note: The source is Florida Property Valuation and Tax Data Book, Florida Department of Revenue
(1996–2006).
with 42% growth since 2003. As of 2006, Florida’s total property tax revenue was
just over $25.7 billion.
Several different bills intended to overhaul the property tax system in Florida were
considered in the 2007 legislative session and a referendum is scheduled for early
2008 that will, if approved, make dramatic changes in the property tax structure
in the state by, among other changes, doubling the homestead exemption amount
to $50,000 per homestead and permitting up to $500,000 of the SOHA savings
from one homestead to be transferred to another homestead should the property
owner decide to relocate to a different homestead within the state within two years.
 Overall Impact of the SOHA
Since implementation in 1995, the amount of property value protected by the
SOHA has increased rather dramatically to over $246 billion as of 2005. Each
dollar of homestead property value that is protected by the SOHA means that
more of the overall tax burden in the state falls on the shoulders of non-homestead
property owners. Exhibit 1 shows the total growth in Florida’s real property value,
growth rates, and the total and percentages of total real property value protected
by the SOHA in the state in each year since its implementation. Notice that theChanges in Property Tax Progressivity  85
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percentage of the SOHA protected value is increasing steadily, even in 1999 when
total property value was relatively unchanged. The rapid rise in total real property
value (including both appreciation and new investment) between 2000 and 2005
is indicative of the impressive growth of the state’s economy in recent years.
 Data Sample Description
Beyond the overall impact of the SOHA in the state, variation in the rates of
market value appreciation and ownership transfers for qualifying properties
implies that the SOHA may have differential impacts on the vertical equity of the
property tax system within the class of properties (homestead properties) it was
intended to protect. If, for example, higher value homestead properties are
appreciating more (less) rapidly than lower value homestead properties, the
protection afforded by the SOHA will lead to a lower (higher) effective assessment
ratio (taxable value divided by market value) over time for higher value homestead
properties in comparison to the effective assessment ratio on lower value
homestead properties. Similarly, if the rate of ownership transfer is greater (less)
for homestead properties in certain market value ranges during periods of rising
property values, the effective assessment ratio on such properties will be less
(more) impacted by the amendment due to the provision that the taxable value be
‘‘reset’’ to current market value upon a transfer of ownership of a homestead
property.
Data available to empirically detect changes in vertical inequity among homestead
properties since the implementation of the SOHA are maintained by the Florida
Department of Revenue, Property Tax Division. Each county in the state is
required by law to report certain information about each parcel of real property
in the county to the Department of Revenue each year, including, but not limited
to, its market value as estimated annually by the county appraiser as of January
1 and all exemption amounts.6 The data are all tax roll records of the state of
Florida as provided by the Department of Revenue for the tax years 1999–2004.
To provide a consistent measure of property value protected by the SOHA across
the study period, the sample for this analysis includes only properties that were
homesteaded at the start of the study period and maintained that status throughout
the period. The ﬁnal sample used in this analysis consists of over 17 million
records. Descriptive statistics of the sample data are provided in Exhibits 2
and 3.
Exhibit 2 shows that the mean market value of homestead properties in the sample
grew from $92,760 in 1999 to $155,890 in 2004, an overall growth of 68%.
Simultaneously, the mean amount of homestead property value protected by the
SOHA in the sample grew from 5.96% to 29.10%, an overall growth of over
388%. The SOHA has clearly and dramatically impacted the property tax system
for homestead properties in the state.
Exhibit 3 shows similar statistics for the data sample divided into thirds for















Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics for Market Values and Percentage of Market Values of Homestead Properties Protected by the SOHA
Roll Year N
Market Value
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Percentage Market Value Protected
Mean Median Std. Dev.
1999 3,581,936 $92,760 $72,280 $105,969 0.0596 0.0315 0.0836
2000 3,352,219 $98,247 $75,812 $119,480 0.0748 0.0468 0.0928
2001 3,026,075 $107,855 $81,577 $145,137 0.1131 0.0908 0.1060
2002 2,746,024 $121,085 $89,889 $175,729 0.1715 0.1566 0.1191
2003 2,503,564 $137,075 $100,770 $200,431 0.2278 0.2181 0.1333
2004 2,270,370 $155,890 $114,000 $224,022 0.2910 0.2913 0.1447
Total 17,480,188 $115,422 $85,400 $162,065 0.1435 0.1082 0.1378Changes in Property Tax Progressivity  87
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Exhibit 3  Mean Market Values of Homestead Properties, Mean Percentage Amounts Protected by the
SOHA, and Percentage Changes in Market Value by the Low, Middle, and High Thirds of the Sample Data
Year Low Mid High
Panel A: Mean Market Value
1999 $39,104 $73,346 $166,915
2000 $40,858 $76,839 $177,554
2001 $43,800 $82,784 $197,911
2002 $47,501 $91,253 $226,634
2003 $52,211 $102,393 $260,062
Panel B: Mean Percentage Amounts Protected by the SOHA
1999 5.49% 5.83% 6.17%
2000 6.54% 7.19% 7.82%
2001 9.69% 10.85% 12.61%
2002 14.21% 16.94% 19.96%
2003 18.33% 23.11% 26.95%
Panel C: Percentage Change in Market Value
2000 4.48% 4.76% 6.37%
2001 7.20% 7.74% 11.47%
2002 8.45% 10.23% 14.51%
2003 9.92% 12.21% 14.75%
Note: Tests of differences between thirds, where appropriate, are statically signiﬁcant at the 0.1%
level.
all value ranges, but the higher value properties in the sample have grown more
rapidly than lower value properties. Similarly, the percentage of property value in
the data sample that is protected by the SOHA has grown most dramatically for
higher value properties. The last section of the table shows that the percentage
change in property value has been greatest for higher value properties.
 Model for Detecting Vertical Equity in the Sample Data
As discussed above, the SOHA may have altered the degree of vertical equity
within the property tax system. The property tax equity research literature contains
numerous methods for detecting and measuring vertical equity within a property
tax system using regression analysis (e.g., Paglin and Fogarty, 1972; Cheng, 1974;88  Allen and Dare
International Association of Assessing Ofﬁcers, 1978; Kochin and Parks, 1982;
Bell, 1984; Clapp, 1990; and Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday, and Hamilton, 1990).
Several of these methods are compared and demonstrated by Sirmans, Diskin, and
Friday (1995), Benson and Schwartz (1997, 2000), Smith (2000), and Allen
(2003). Each of the methods considered in the above studies suffers from its own
strengths and shortcomings and there is, therefore, no uniformly accepted ‘‘best’’
method among property tax researchers for evaluating property tax system vertical
equity.
Most of the disagreement over the proper method for analyzing vertical equity in
property tax systems focuses on the problematic use of sale price as a proxy for
market value and endogeneity between market value and assessed value. [See
Clapp (1990) and Sirmans, Diskin, and Friday (1995) for more detailed
discussions of this issue.] We avoid the ﬁrst of these issues because we are not
concerned with the appropriateness of sale price as an indicator of market value.
(Sale price does not appear in our model.) Our focus is on the impact of the
SOHA as a result of differential appreciation and relocation rates, not on appraisal
inaccuracy. We accept appraisers’ estimates of market value at face value. We
avoid the endogeneity problem by using the percentage of the appraiser’s estimate
of market value (MV) protected by the SOHA as the dependent variable, and the
natural log of MV as the primary independent variable of interest.
Because the objective of this paper is to document the degree, if any, to which
the SOHA has resulted in different accumulated property tax protection across
homestead properties of different values over time, we propose the following
statistical model:
6
(MV  AV)/MV/     lnMV   DlnMV  e, (1)  iii 01 ij j i i
j2
where MVi and AVi are the just and assessed values for property i, respectively,
and (MVi  AVi)/MVi, is the percentage of the market value shielded from taxation
by SOHA for each property. Interaction variables are created by multiplying the
tax roll year dummy variables, Dj, by the natural log of MVi. The estimates of the
coefﬁcients for these interaction variables reﬂect the marginal changes in the
variable lnMVi for each succeeding year. If the effects of SOHA are accumulating
in a regressive (progressive) fashion, the coefﬁcient estimates of the slope (1)
and marginal slope terms (2 through 6) will be positive (negative). Persistently
increasing or decreasing marginal slope coefﬁcients over time would indicate that
the changes in the equity of overall tax structure are ongoing.7 Our analysis
method captures differences in the percentage of homestead property value
protected by the SOHA between higher and lower value properties over time.Changes in Property Tax Progressivity  89
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Exhibit 4  Regression Estimates of Percentage of Market Value Shielded from Taxation Created by the











Notes: The number of observations is 17,480,188.
 Results
Estimating the parameters of the model in Equation (1) using the sample data
generates the results shown in Exhibit 4. The coefﬁcient on lnMV is signiﬁcant
and positive, indicating increasing protected value from taxation as market value
increases. In other words, higher value properties receive a greater beneﬁt of the
SOHA tax shield relative to lower value properties.8
The coefﬁcients for the interaction variables are signiﬁcant and positive and thus
indicate increasing tax shields over time for higher value properties. F-tests of
equality between the slope coefﬁcients of each subsequent year (not shown)
indicate that the coefﬁcients are not equal: the SOHA tax savings persistently
increases with time for higher value properties relative to lower value properties.
For example, the interaction coefﬁcient for 2004 is 19 times as great as the
coefﬁcient for 2000. These results provide strong evidence that the property tax
system for homestead properties is becoming increasingly less progressive, that
is, more neutral.
 Conclusion
There is little doubt that the SOHA has shifted a signiﬁcant portion of the property
tax burden away from homestead properties and onto the shoulders of non-
homestead properties. As of 2005, 13.9% of the total real property value in the
state of Florida was protected from taxation by the SOHA. In addition, there is90  Allen and Dare
little doubt that the standard $25,000 exemption available to all homestead
properties imposes progressivity in the state’s property tax system for homestead
properties. The purpose of this study was to investigate any potential shift in the
progressivity of the state’s property tax system within the class of properties the
SOHA was intended to protect, an argument that early opponents of the SOHA
unsuccessfully attempted to use to derail its adoption on the grounds that the
amounts of value appreciation and/or rates of ownership transfers may differ
across property value ranges.
The results of analyzing of over 17 million observations over a six-year period
strongly suggest that the degree of progressivity in Florida’s property tax system
for homestead properties has persistently declined in recent years. The state has
experienced widespread and rapid increases in property values in most areas but,
as the anecdotal evidence presented in Exhibit 3 suggests, the percentages
increases tend to have been greater for higher value homesteads than for lower
value homesteads. Combining the effects of differential appreciation and
ownership transfers across market value ranges, the overall impact of the SOHA
has been a reduction in the degree of progressivity in the state’s property tax
system during the study period. These results are consistent with the notion that
owners of higher value homestead properties enjoy greater beneﬁts from the
SOHA than owners of lower value homestead properties in Florida.
This study provides potentially valuable information for policymakers and real
estate market analysts. The results show that political manipulations of the
property tax system to provide special treatment to homestead property owners
may not uniformly beneﬁt all of those property owners. The SOHA limits
increases in taxable value from year to year, but requires the ‘‘resetting’’of taxable
value to market value upon a transfer of ownership. Longer tenure property owners
may have lower effective tax rates than shorter tenure owners in markets with
rising property values. The different effective tax rates may affect property owners’
decisions to relocate as their housing preferences change. Different rates of
appreciation across property value ranges can exacerbate the impact of the SOHA
on property owners’ relocation decisions.
 Endnotes
1 Homestead properties are those that serve as the primary personal residence of the
owner(s) as of January 1 of each year.
2 The market value of each taxable property in Florida is estimated annually by elected
county property appraisers. We readily acknowledge that market value is a theoretical
concept that cannot be directly observed. We assume that estimates of market value can
be considered a random variable centered on true market value. Taxable (or assessed)
value is determined by legal exemptions afforded to homestead property owners and the
reduction in taxable value as a result of the SOHA.
3 Horizontal equity in property tax systems refers to different effective tax rates across
properties with the same market values. The present study focuses on vertical equity.Changes in Property Tax Progressivity  91
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4 Benson and Schwartz (1997) have suggested additional factors that might explain
regressivity in property tax systems. They note that wealthy homeowners may be more
likely to challenge their property tax assessments, that higher value properties pose
additional difﬁculties for appraisers given their unique features and amenities relative to
lower value homes, that upper-end homes trade in thinner markets, and that county
appraisers may lack ample staff and resources to accurately estimate market value for
high value homes.
5 The SOHA in Florida is similar to Proposition 13 that was implemented in California in
1978. Annual property taxes under Proposition 13 are limited to 1% of assessed value,
and assessed value may only be increased by a maximum of 2% per year. When
ownership of a property is transferred, the assessed value resets to market value for the
new owner.
6 Exemptions include the SOHA protected amounts as described earlier, plus a standard
$25,000 exemption for all homestead properties, a $2,500 senior citizens exemption
(select counties only), and a variety of lesser exemptions such as $500 for disabled
persons, $5,000 for disabled veterans, and $500 for widows/widowers. Subtracting all
available exemptions from a property’s market value yields its assessed value.
7 The use of interaction effects is well accepted and is explored in detail in Neter, Kutner,
Nachtsheim, and Wasserman (1996).
8 We use a consistent level of 0.1% level of signiﬁcance throughout our discussion of the
results.
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